The objective of this research was to understand the phenomenon of intuition from the perspective of the intuitor. Against a background of a steadily growing interest in intuition in managerial decision research, and inclining towards a phenomenological stance, the research used a novel linguistic method based on 'de-nominalization' to access participants' (124 human resource practitioners) experiences of intuition. Based on an analysis of responses to the question 'what happens when you intuit?' the article: defines intuition based on participants' subjective experiences; reveals the subjective experience of intuition as comprising three phases -'intuiting', 'intuition', and 'implementing'; uncovers two aspects of intuitive affect -'bodily awareness' and 'cognitive awareness'; establishes that participants use primary metaphors to articulate their experiences of intuition. The article outlines the theoretical implications and practical relevance of these findings, and makes suggestions for further qualitative phenomenological studies of intuition.
Introduction
The motivation for this research is a keen interest in the subjective experience of intuition.
For many decades the study of intuition inhabited the fringes of social science, it was often equated with "parapsychology, telepathy, and premonition…esoteric and 'New Age' thinking" (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008: 1) . Recent years have witnessed a surge of interest in intuition amongst organizational researchers (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012; Sinclair, 2011 Sinclair, , 2014 . Consequently there have been many important advances in defining, conceptualizing, and theorizing the construct (e.g. Dane & Pratt, 2007; Dörfler & Akermann, 2013; Hodgkinson & Clarke, 2007; Hogarth, 2010; Salas, Rosen & DiazGranados, 2010; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005; Sinclair, 2010 Sinclair, , 2011 and asserting its importance for management practice (e.g. Miller & Ireland, 2005; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Sadler-Smith & Burke-Smalley, 2015) .
However, empirical work on intuition is not extensive (e.g. Burke & Miller, 1999;  Clarke & Mackaness, 2001; Coget, Haag & Gibson, 2011; Dane, Rockman & Pratt, 2012; Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane, Nicholson & Willman, 2011; Huang & Pearce, 2015; Khatri & Ng, 2000; Kickul, Gundry, Barbosa & Whitcanack, 2009; Sinclair, 2014; Willman, Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson, & Soane, 2001 ). There is a paucity of qualitative intuition research. In particular the subjective experience of intuition is poorly-understood. Intuition research therefore faces an important challenge: because much current knowledge rests largely on researchers' speculative arguments and abstract theorizations, we need to know more about intuition from the perspective of the intuitor in order to gain more direct access to the "essence" of this phenomenon (see: Merleau-Ponty, 1945 /1996 . The objective of the research was to elicit direct, first-hand accounts from practitioners of what actually happens when they 'intuit'. 5 and Miller (1999) , and others. Although this research put intuition 'on the map' it was largely a-theoretic, concerned mainly with the use and effectiveness of intuition in the day-today practice of management rather than with its underlying psychological processes (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 2012 ). It was not until the first decade of the 21 st century that organizational researchers mobilized a plausible theoretical framework for making sense of intuition.
Dual-process/dual-system theories share the core assumption that human information processing is accomplished in two dissimilar but complementary ways ('analytically' or 'intuitively') by means of two substantially different and differently-evolved types of thinking "one fast and intuitive [System 1], the other slow and deliberative [System 2]"
(Evans and Stanovich, 2013, p.223) . This idea was captured succinctly, but metaphorically,
by Evans (2003) as characterizing "two minds in one brain" (p.454). Dual-process theory has been used by organizational researchers in defining and theorizing managerial intuition, for example: (1) "intuition is a non-sequential information processing mode, which comprises both cognitive and affective elements and results in direct knowing without any use of conscious reasoning" (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005: 357) ; (2) "intuitions are affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-conscious and holistic associations" (Dane & Pratt, 2007: 40) ; (3) Chassy and Gobet (2011) capture succinctly the idea that intuition relies upon the operation of cognitive and emotional processes: "The information captured by perception, plus the knowledge activated by resonance, and the knowledge activated by emotional saliency are integrated into one single representation [an intuition] which points to a solution" (p.207). Researchers have hypothesized the antecedents of intuitive judgment (e.g. practice, implicit learning, stylistic disposition, context, etc.) as well as its direct and moderated relationships with decision making behaviours (Blume & Covin, 2011; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Sadler-Smith, 2015; Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005) .
Neurologists have used a variety of experimental tasks (e.g. the Iowa Gambling Task) and measurement techniques (e.g. skin conductance response, SCR) to explore the bioregulatory mechanisms of intuitive decision making, as in for example Damasio and colleagues' 'somatic marker hypothesis' (Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 1999 , Damasio et al.,1999 . These insights have been complemented by research which has established a preliminary 'neural geography' of intuition (Segalowitz, 2007) . For example, Lieberman, Jarcho and Satpute (2004) found that effortful, intentional explicit judgments (i.e. in domains where participants had low levels of experience and expertise) were associated with activations in a network of brain regions which comprise a 'reflective' system (referred to as the C-system), whilst intuition-based judgments (i.e. low-effort implicit judgments in domains where the participants had high experience and expertise) on the other hand were associated with activations in a variety of brain regions which together comprise a reflexive system (the X-system) including the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) and amygdala (Lieberman, et al., 2004; cf. Bechara, et al., 1997) .
The question arises however of how far do these various insights, many of which rely on indirect descriptions and inferences, take us towards understanding intuition as experienced by the intuitor? If there is any truth in the claim that the description of a cognitive process in the first person, i.e. as the subject experiences it, is richer than any indirect description (Petitmengin, 2006 ) then a bottom-up, inductive mode of inquiry is likely to help us in further 'sharpening' the construct (Eisenhardt, 1989) and getting closer to the essence of intuition.
Linguistics
Dane and Pratt (2007) conceptualize intuition "both by its process (which we [i.e. they] refer to as intuiting), as well as its outcome (which we term intuitive judgments)" (p. Pratt's (2007) foregrounding of 'intuiting' provides a helpful signpost for how to move forward in getting closer to the subjective experience of intuition. Taking the 'intuitive judgment-versus-intuiting' distinction as a starting point, this research sought a novel way to access subjects' experiences of intuition; in doing so it turned to linguistics.
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In English grammar the term 'nominalization' means 'noun-like', therefore to 'denominalize' a noun is to "make it less noun-like, or turn it into a verb, adjective, or some other grammatical category" (Payne, 1997: 94) . Recent well-known examples of denominalizations from noun to verb include 'to friend', and 'to Google'. De-nominalization is sometimes referred to clumsily as 'verbing'; the reverse process is nominalization (or 'nouning'), where a verb is turned into a noun, e.g. 'explain' becomes 'explanation', or indeed 'nominalize' becomes 'nominalization'. Grammarians and linguists advise that nominalizations be avoided in written English, since using the noun conceals the action, hence their exhortations that we use strong active verbs in our writing lest it falls prey to "zombie nouns" (Pinker, 2014: 50) . De-nominalizing can serve useful grammatical and related purposes (see Payne, 1997: 94-96 for a summary). 'Generic de-nominalization' (Payne, 1997) forms a verb from whatever the noun refers to, hence the generic denominalizing of 'intuition' renders 'intuit' . Generic de-nominalizing (hereafter 'denominalizing') opens up the possibility that using the verb, instead of the noun, to access participants' subjective experience of intuition could render its "deep structure" (Harman & O'Neill, 1981: 450) more transparent.
One of the benefits of de-nominalizing for accessing subjective experience is that it allows participants to retrieve and reflect on their deeper and direct personal experiences of the action instantiated in the verb rather than undertake de-contextualized and surface musings on the meaning of the noun. (Gendlin, 1969; Merleau-Ponty, 1945 /1996 Petitmengin, 1999 Petitmengin, , 2006 Tosey & Mathison, 2010; Varela & Shear, 1999) .
Method, sample and procedure
The research method used was very straightforward: participants were asked, in the convenient setting of professional development seminars on the topic of intuition, 'what happens when you intuit?' Participants were human resource practitioners who had elected to attend a seminar for personal and professional development purposes. The seminars (five in total, lasting an hour-and-half each) were conducted by the author at various locations across the south east of the UK. The total number of participants was 124. At the beginning of each seminar following a brief introduction (i.e. before the exposition of any substantive content), participants were requested to recollect an occasion (or occasions) during which they had experienced an intuition. They were allowed a short time during which to reflect quietly on this experience, and from their recollections and reflections were then asked to 
Data analysis
The data set was 124 individual responses; these varied in length from six words (e.g. "when I intuit I generate ideas") to 44 words (i.e. "when I intuit my gut tells me I need to seek more information and ask more questions to better understand a situation. My head starts to question what I am seeing or hearing and I feel I need to do something or take action").
There were 528 different words and 2082 words in total in the data set. As a preliminary validity check, the Hermetic Word Frequency Counter™ software (Version 14.422) was used to count the frequency of use of all words in the intuit groups' responses compared to the insight group's responses. These were then ranked by frequency of use, excluded definite/indefinite articles, conjunctions, and other grammatical features superfluous to the research purpose, only focusing on content words (adjectives, nouns, verbs, adverbs) . In the pared-down list of the twenty most frequently used content words only the words 'feel/feeling' and 'sense' occurred in both lists. Whilst no formal criterion or threshold by which to objectively assess any overlap was used, the fact that there were only two shared words amongst the most frequently used words offered assurance that the sentence completion task 'when I intuit…' captured participants' perception of intuition rather than their perception of some related but extraneous phenomenon, such as insight.
Following this preliminary check data were analysed in a coding process as follows.
All statements were read and re-read several times in order to identify key units of text. This process resulted in the decomposition of each statement into one or more units of text. A unit of text was defined as a coherent group of words which were of relevance to the phenomenon of interest (i.e. intuition). For example, the statement "When I intuit I generate ideas" decomposed easily into a single unit of text 'generate ideas'. The statement "When I intuit I make a decision or come to a conclusion based on my experience and judgement rounded-off with gut instinct, i.e. it feels right" was decomposed into the following units of text: 'make a decision'; 'come to a conclusion'; 'based on my experience'; 'gut instinct'; and 'feels right'.
A total of 212 units of text were identified. Participants' statements were coded in a process of reading and re-reading; this involved an iterative to-ing and fro-ing between the statements, abstracted units of text, and emerging codes. The reliability of the outcome of this procedure was assessed by having two independent raters classify the units of text. The level of agreement between the two raters was assessed using Cohen's kappa (κ) (Cohen, 1960) ; the computed value was κ = 0.77 (SE = 0.07). 1 This indicated a "substantial" strength of inter-rater agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977: 165) thus offering assurance as to the reliability of the classifications.
Findings
The overall analytical approach and the derived data structure is consistent with the method recommended by Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2013) for inductive research as implemented, for example in Nag, Corley and Gioia (2007) and Pratt, Rockmann, and Kaufmann (2006) .
In keeping with this approach the data structure and sample units of text are shown in Figure   1 .
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The findings will now be described and interpreted in terms of the three aggregate dimensions ('intuiting', 'intuition', and 'implementing'), theme-by-theme, and illustrated with representative units of text.
Intuiting
The first superordinate dimension consisted of the antecedents and the processes of intuiting.
Antecedents ( Processing is outside of conscious awareness, one participant described it as being "under the surface" (2), further examples were:
"When I intuit: I sense an unsaid (15); I process a massive amount of information at a primitive level (42); I feel as though [the] answer/response appears from nowhere (77); I am never really sure where the answer comes from (27)."
It also was evident in participants' writings that these inaccessible processes often are fast, Participants acknowledged the role of experience and pattern matching in intuiting and that the mechanisms and processes are not readily available to introspection. As depicted in these data 'intuiting' is automatic, rapid, and subconscious, and occurs in response to the matching of cues against informational substrates built-up by past experiences and prior learnings.
This finding is synthesized into the definition of intuition as reported in the 'Discussion' section below.
Intuition
Intuitions emerge into consciousness as 'bodily awareness' and 'cognitive awareness'.
Bodily awareness (gut reactions; feelings): this theme was comprised of two first-order concepts 'gut reactions' and 'feelings'. Both concepts captured the perception that intuitions were somatic (i.e. of, or relating to, the body) but they differed in terms of the degree of specificity with which this awareness could be located: the visceral 'gut reaction' first-order concept captured a more specifically-located bodily awareness whereas the 'feelings' first-order concept captured a less specifically-located, but nonetheless deemed to be bodily,
awareness. An example of the former is:
"When I intuit I get: feelings in my stomach (10); excited buzz in my stomach (18); weird feeling in my stomach (58); butterflies (92)."
It is noteworthy that participants used metaphors to describe these bodily awarenesses, for example "buzz", and "butterflies". 'Gut reactions' was the third most common first-order concept (see Appendix 1). In other instances intuition was described in terms categorized as bodily awareness but less precisely located, i.e. as a more general 'feeling' state, for example: In participants' writings repeated articulations were encountered on the theme that intuition is somatic; this is captured under the general label of 'bodily awareness'.
Cognitive awareness (sense; mental images): as well as emerging as a bodily awareness (see above) intuition was also expressed in terms that were categorized as a 'cognitive awareness'.
In this theme participants wrote about intuition in two ways, first as an inscrutable 'sense', for example:
"When I intuit I: get a sense for something (25); get a sense of something coming together (synthesis) (7); get a sense of something bigger than what the words I've heard exactly mean (21)."
On the other hand some participants associated intuition with mental images (i.e. mental representations which may occur in various modalities) in visual and auditory modes, for example as 'voice' and 'mind's eye':
"When I intuit I: see 'it' in my mind's eye (7); get a picture in my mind (21); listen to that small voice in my head (28); get an inner voice which I hear and consider [to be] right course of action" (50).
It was evident from some participants' writings that they perceived intuition as occurring as a cognitive 'sense' or more well-defined 'mental image'; these two first-order concepts were captured under the theme of 'cognitive awareness'. The bodily and cognitive aspects of intuitive affect are synthesized into the definition of intuition as reported in the 'Discussion' section below.
Implementing
Intuitive judgements were implemented as behavioural responses (for example, taking a decisive action, anticipating a predicted outcome) based on the intuitor's interpretation of the intuitive signal or insight (for example, to approach or avoid a person or situation, be able to 'see' connections which were previously not apparent). It should be noted that the term 'Implementing' is not intended to indicate that an intuition is necessarily 'heeded'; acting in response to an intuition might mean, paradoxically, that the intuition is consciously supressed (for example by the intervention of rational processing, see below). The language used to describe these creative intuitions was replete with metaphors: "bubble up", "inspirations grab", "flash", "mind opens up", and "flow". an indication to act in a certain way (37); create scenarios and make plans [and] decisions ( Supplementary analysis on the use of metaphor: As depicted in the above interpretation, participants wrote about intuition in a variety of different idioms both literal and metaphorical. Examples of the use of metaphorical language in 'intuiting' were the knowledge was "at the back of my mind", and there was "something under the surface". In the 'intuition' dimension the language used was replete with embodied metaphors, for example "excited buzz", "butterflies", "mind's eye", and "inner voice". Metaphors were used in 'implementing' for example to express the "right path", how choices were "weighed-up", being 'grabbed' by inspirations, and ideas that "bubbled up". In order to explore variations in usage it was decided to quantify the use of metaphors in each of the three aggregate Intuiting, as far as the intuitor is concerned, appears to be largely automatic involving little in the way of effortful cognition (see Stanovich, 2009 ). It is recognized that attempts can be made to trigger intuition by "clear intention" (Sinclair, 2010: 380) and introspecting on the intuitive assessment of a situation (e.g. 'what does your gut tell you?'), or in the instinctive moral reactions evoked by an ethical dilemma, (see Haidt [2001] for examples of stimulus materials) and by cultivating "intuitive receptivity" (Tomasino, 2011: 247) .
Outcomes

Behaviours
Subjects "understand instinctively without the need for conscious reasoning" (66), so much so that the experience of intuiting provides evaluations arrived at with minimal conscious cognition ("it is just right" (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2011 : 1503 .
This research addresses a particular shortcoming in current theorizations by shedding light on the nature and role of intuitive affect. Prior research is uneven in acknowledging affect's role in intuitive judgment. For example, the Simonian position is that intuitions are analyses that have been 'frozen into habit' which give decision makers the capacity for "rapid response through recognition" (Simon, 1987: 63) . In the same vein, Klein's (2003) standpoint is largely cognitive: intuitions are fundamentally 'non-conscious analyses'. These are essentially expertise-based views of intuition, however Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) note that "proponents of experience-based intuition [i.e. expertise] focus solely on the cognitive elements of the construct" (p.358). Consequently intuitive affect is sometimes overlooked or treated as a something of 'black-box' within the intuition-as-expertise view (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004 ).
Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) as wholly distinct entities (e.g. Panksepp, 2003) is potentially unhelpful in intuition research, whereas conceiving the boundary between them as being rather more permeable opens the way to a potentially richer conceptualization. Clore (1992) is somewhat helpful in this regard in suggesting that feelings can be grouped into three categories: (1) affective feelings:
valenced subjective experiences encompassing moods and emotions; (2) bodily feelings:
reflections of physical processes such as hunger or pain; (3) cognitive feelings: experiential states that accompany cognitive processes such as feelings of familiarity (Clore, 1992; Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2010) . Whilst the exact demarcations suggested by Clore (1992) do not map exactly onto intuition (since this was not his intention), the notion of different types of feeling states and the specific proposal that 'cognitive feeling' need not be an oxymoron is a helpful insight.
Whilst some intuition researchers have distinguished between the level (high-low) and valance (positive-negative) of intuitive judgments (Dane & Pratt, 2009) , the general use of the term 'affect' can be somewhat imprecise, for example 'intuitive affect' is depicted as a unitary phenomenon, most often equated with 'gut feel' (Agor, 1986; Burke & Miller, 1999; Hayashi, 2001; Khatri & Ng, 2000) . The findings reported here support an alternative and more nuanced view. The experiential state of 'intuition' is revealed as having two elements:
'bodily awareness' and 'cognitive awareness'. There is supporting evidence from prior research for this assertion in that greater reliance on cognitive feelings is associated with higher levels of faith in intuition (Keller & Bless, 2008) . Cognitive feelings are one way in which the products of subconscious processes become registered, articulated, and interpreted (Greifeneder, et al., 2010) . 'Affect infusion' (Forgas, 1995) might therefore entail bodily or cognitive feeling states. This joint view accommodates a broader conceptualization of intuition beyond equating it solely with 'gut feelings', separates intuitive affect from primary emotions (e.g. fear), and also bridges relevant literatures on somatic, affective, and cognitive states (e.g. Baumann & Kuhl, 2002; Damasio, 1999; Dunn, et al. 2010; Forgas, 1995; Slovic et al., 2004) .
A corollary of the above is that intuitive affect may be delineated in terms of 'locus'
(bodily/cognitive), 'level' (high/low), and 'valence' (positive/negative); on this basis a 2 × 2 × 2 typology of intuitive affect is proposed, see Figure 3 . For example, a positively-valenced, high-level intuitive affect with a cognitive locus is a 'strong positive hunch' (rear top right cell in Figure 3) , whereas a negatively-valenced, low-level intuitive affect with a bodily locus is a 'weak negative gut feeling' (front bottom left cell). This typology also raises interesting questions, which this research did not set out to answer, as to whether or not the level of the affective charge can in fact be 'zero' in intuitive judgment (Sinclair, 2010) .
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Participants frequently used metaphors to express what happens when they intuit.
Metaphors are a linguistic means of articulating and interpreting experiences, and substitute for a tacit and "deeper knowledge" (Tsoukas, 1991: 582) . The metaphoric idiom involves the transfer of information from a familiar domain (source) to a new domain (target) in order to
express similarities between what a word normally designates in its source domain and what it is intended to designate in its target domain (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) . Metaphors are pervasive in everyday life, not only in language but also in thought and action to the extent that how we think and act is "fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 3) . Furthermore, metaphors are not only a way in which the experiential/intuitive system "encodes reality" (Epstein, 2011: 39) , they are one of the principal ways of framing and understanding organizational life (Morgan, 1980) .
Complex metaphors such as 'organizational identity' (Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008) can be composed of several primary metaphors (Grady, 1999) . Primary metaphors permit the expression of an internal subjective experience; they are relevant for intuition research because they are grounded in source domains related to embodied experiences (e.g.
temperature, size, vision, orientation, etc.), constituting experientially-based metaphorical mappings, or 'correlations' from every-day experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) . For example, the mapping 'up is good whereas down is bad' as in the metaphor "things just don't stack up" (orientation) signifies that the situation is 'not up' and therefore 'not good';
likewise, "I see what you mean" (vision) signifying 'seeing-as-knowing ' (Feldman, 2008) .
Primary metaphors are elemental in that it is not possible to regress any further to more 'primordial' descriptions (Cornelissen & Kafouros, 2008; Gibbs, 2006) .
Using these various ideas to support an analysis of the metaphorical content of participants' writings about intuition it was possible to discern two further discoveries: (1) participants did indeed use primary metaphors (for example, "warm", "path", "flow", "flash", as Poincaré, Darwin and Einstein, having insightful moments that were preceded by creative intuitions (Ghiselin, 1952 (Ghiselin, /1985 Miller, 1992; Sternberg & Davidson, 1995; Wallas, 1926) .
Researching the role of creative intuitions in scientific and technical breakthroughs could develop new understandings of the cognitive and affective processes implicated in innovation and new production development, especially at the front-end of these processes (Hyppanen, 2014) and in so-called 'edging' (i.e. "being exposed to a situation requiring stretch and extra cognitive or emotional effort") (Teerikangas & Välikangas, 2014: 77) .
Implications, limitations and future research
As noted in the 'Introduction', intuition research in management is characterized by a scarcity of qualitative work. This research is one of a small handful of studies in this area and has implications for intuition theory and hints at several new research directions as follows: (1) the research sharpens and elaborates the way intuition is conceptualized, but in contrast to other recent research it has done so directly, 'bottom-up' so to speak, from the perspective of data and experience rather than indirectly from theory; (2) researchers have previously equated intuitions with 'gut feelings' (e.g. Burke & Miller, 1999; Hayashi, 2001 ) however 28 these data suggest this might be insufficient. A more helpful framing is a general category of 'intuitive affect' within which bodily feelings (referred to colloquially as 'gut feel') and cognitive feelings (referred to colloquially as 'hunch' or 'vibe') comprise two separate aspects of the subjective experience of intuition; (3) it expands Dane and Pratt's (2007) 'intuiting' and 'intuitive judgment' distinction ( Figure 2a ) into three elements, 'intuiting', 'intuition', and 'implementing' (Figure 2b ) which offers a tentative three-phase model; (4) there is evidence that the deeper, subjective experience of intuition, instantiated in bodily and cognitive feelings, is articulated and interpreted using the linguistic idiom of metaphor.
These various contributions should be seen in-context: we know a considerable amount about what constitutes 'intuitive expertise' (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2006; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Klein, 1998 Klein, , 2003 Klein et al., 1988; Salas et al., 2010) but markedly less about how intuitive expertise is embodied and enacted in organizational settings. By foregrounding the embodiment and implementing of intuition, this research connects organizational behaviour research with emerging streams of more process-oriented inquiry, including phenomenological, practice-based, ethnomethodological, discourse, and linguistically-and sociolinguistically-oriented studies. These various sub-fields offer theories and methods that could be used for new studies that capture the experience of intuition phenomenologically, ethnographically, discursively, and performatively.
It is evident from these data that subjects' 'awareness' of intuition is the focal element of their experience. It is surprising therefore that, as noted in above, comparatively little theoretical or empirical attention has been given to understanding this aspect of the phenomenon (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2007) . We need to know more about the detailed nature of intuitive affect over-and-above mere attributions to 'gut feelings', and also explore:
(1) whether different feeling states arise under different conditions; (2) the possibility of individual differences in the subjective experience of intuition, including individuals' sensitivities to their bodily state (Dunn et al., 2010) , variability in the modalities in which intuition presents itself (Miller, 1992; Vaughan, 1979) , perceptions of where the 'felt sense' (Gendlin, 1969) of intuition is located (e.g. by means of 'body mapping' on a mannequin or other means of representing the human form); (3) the neural correlates (via functional neuroimaging studies) of the various aspects of intuitive affect uncovered in this research (see Lieberman et al., 2004; Segalowitz, 2007) .
A limitation of the sample of was that participants (human resource practitioners) selfselected to attend the seminar, hence they may have been well-motivated to describe intuition and biased in favour of doing so. Future research might overcome this limitation by using randomly selected samples. The use of convenience sampling limits the generalizability of the research therefore it would be interesting to undertake similar research with other occupational groups who use intuition in their decisions such as entrepreneurs (Blume & Covin, 2011; Mitchell, Friga & Mitchell, 2005; Sadler-Smith, 2015) as well with as management students. The questioning technique was limited in the extent to which it was able to access the unconscious processes from which intuitions emanate; that said, the elicitation and analysis of metaphors may be one way to glimpse these processes and help intuition researchers, as well as practitioners, to 'see through a glass darkly' into the deeper structure of their intuitions.
2
The study of managers' experiences of intuition promises to be a fertile area for phenomenological field work. De-nominalization was deployed so that participants might retrieve and reflect on their direct personal experiences of the object (intuition) instantiated in the verb (intuit). The research did not seek to distinguish between expert and creative intuitions (any distinctions that arose did so inductively from the data) however an area for future inquiry might be to apply de-nominalization, or similar technique, to try to understand specifically what happens when someone 'expertly intuits' versus 'creatively intuits'.
Likewise, the same approach could also be readily applied by researchers who wish to understand informants' subjective experiences of other phenomena and processes (e.g. 'leading', 'deciding', etc.) . This research presents a novel methodological contribution which complements other approaches (e.g. Petitmengin 2006 Petitmengin , 2014 and expands the current inventory of intuition research methods (see : Sinclair, 2014 for an up-to-date review).
A further limitation of the research is the fact that given the author's theoretical positioning it was difficult not to view the data through a dual-process lens. A number of researchers have challenged the pre-eminence of the dual-process paradigm (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2010; Keren, 2013; Osman, 2004) , and proposed alternative 'System 0' (Dreyfus, 2014), 'unimodel' (Kruglanski, 2013) , and even 'System 3' (Li, 2014) conceptualizations. Whilst it is acknowledged that these alternative views exist there are no compelling reasons, either conceptual or empirical, for the abandonment of the dual-process position in favour of a single-or tripartite-theoretic view. The baseline position from which this research was conducted resonates with that of Kahneman (2011) and Evans and Stanovich: (2013a&b), namely: "fast processing requiring little resources must combine with another kind of processing that is slow, effortful, and resource intensive" (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a: 268) and that this "dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science" (Evans & Stanovich, 2013b: 223) .
Although the research did not set out explicitly to elicit or study metaphors the method used proved to be a quick and efficient means to access them. Its limitation was that participants were not asked expressly to use metaphors; on the other hand by not deliberately framing the question to induce metaphorical expression the research ended-up eliciting 'natural language' use of metaphors (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003 The findings of this research point to a number of implications for management development and management practice. First, this research corroborates that intuition is relevant in human resource practice (Miles & Sadler-Smith, 2014) , therefore human resource practitioners (and managers more generally) need to develop an awareness of the pitfalls and potential of intuitive judgement. Second, managers should be helped to appreciate that there are different types of intuition, and particularly be able to discern between expert intuition and creative intuitions in order that they can recognise the approach/avoid signals that expert intuition offers and the insights that creative intuitions can provide. Third, as well as there being different types of intuition, managers also need to appreciate that intuition can manifest both somatically (as a 'gut feeling') and cognitively (as a 'hunch') and that these subjective states should be acknowledged and listened to, but not necessarily heeded. Fourth, the use of intuitions in organizational decision making is confounded by the fact that intuitive judgements are highly subjective, however encouraging and eliciting metaphorical expression of intuitions could help managers articulate, interpret and enact their own, and others', intuitions, and thereby enable sense-making and support group decision making and organizational learning processes (Crossan, Lane & White, 1999) . Managers need to build and be confident in using a personal 'lexicon for intuition'. Finally, it is important that organizations create the conditions for intuitive expertise to develop (e.g. through experience, coaching, and feedback) and for creative intuitions to flourish (e.g. by allowing the mental space for unconscious processes to operate and generate insights that can lead to creative problem solving, invention, and innovation).
This research has sought to get closer empirically to the subjective experience of intuition. In embracing this challenge a novel qualitative method was applied which used the linguistic device of de-nominalization to access intuition's deeper structure. By paying very
close attention to what practitioners wrote about their experiences of intuition this research has developed a model which positions the subjective experience of intuition at the fulcrum of intuiting (pre-intuition) and implementing (post-intuition). Through replication and extension with different samples in different contexts, by developing and elaborating the linguistic method, designing new instruments based on these raw data, and proposing and testing new hypotheses, this research could have important implications for how we understand the essence of a phenomenon which is seen increasingly as pivotal in organizational practice.
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Notes
Implement -ing
Outcomes Insight "Make productive connections between previous unconnected or apparently unrelated ideas" (105)
Negative signal "I know something is wrong" (56)
Positive signal "Something clicks inside that I recognize as clearly right" (5)
Behaviours Anticipating "Sense that someone is going to say something" (17) Deciding "Guides me towards concrete direction, decision or action" (20) Judging "Cannot rationalize an absolute decision so I make a casting vote based on intuition" (38) 
